This paper uses dimensional analysis, leverage neutrality, and a market microstructure invariance principle to derive scaling laws for transaction costs functions, the width of bid-ask spreads, the size distribution of bets, the speed of bet execution, the natural minimum price fluctuations (tick size), and the natural smallest quantity which can be traded (minimum lot size). For example, the basic liquidity measure is proportional to the cube root of the ratio of dollar volume to return variance. Bid-ask spreads are predicted to be inversely proportional to the liquidity measure. The scaling is illustrated by showing that bid-ask spreads of
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In financial markets, institutional investors trade by implementing speculative "bets" which move prices. A bet is a decision to buy or sell a quantity of institutional size. Traders execute bets by dividing them into separate orders, shredding the orders into small pieces, and executing numerous smaller quantities over time. For securities, the time frame of execution may be minutes, hours, days, or weeks. As emphasized in Gabaix et al. (2003) , large trades move prices and incur trading costs. Both market microstructure and econophysics study how prices result from the process of trading securities; the findings are summarized by Foucault, Pagano and Roell (2013) and Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo (2009) , respectively.
Physics researchers obtain powerful results by using dimensional analysis to reduce the dimensionality of problems, as reviewed in Barenblatt (1996) . For example, Kolmogorov (1941) proposed a simple dimensional analysis argument to derive his "5/3-law" for the energy distribution in a turbulent fluid. Similar analysis can be used to infer the size and number of molecules in a mole of gas or the size of the explosive energy in an atomic blast from measurable large-scale physical quantities, as discussed in Batchelor (1996) . While finance and economics are fields which respect consistency of units-e.g., by maintaining a distinction between stocks and flows-dimensional analysis is not generally used to derive new results. This paper attempts to change this by using simple principles relating market liquidity measures to volume and volatility in a non-obvious non-linear manner.
In physics, dimensional analysis begins with fundamental units of mass, distance, and time. In finance, dimensional analysis begins with fundamental units of time, currency, and shares (or contracts). In physics, dimensional analysis is often augmented by a conservation law based on principles of physics. In finance, proceeding further requires introducing conservation laws based on principles of finance. These conservation laws naturally take a form of no-arbitrage restrictions. The option-pricing model of Black and Scholes (1973) is based on the no-arbitrage principle that all riskless trading strategies must earn the same riskfree return. Here we use a less restrictive, more simplistic no-arbitrage principle closely related to the leverage neutrality principle of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , which states that changes in a firm's mix of equity and debt securities do not affect the economic outcomes associated with execution of bets which transfer the risks embedded in the firm's securities. If a risky asset is combined with positive or negative amounts of an infinitely liquid riskless cash-equivalent asset and the bundle is traded as a single package, then the economics behind these "package" trades do not depend on how much riskless asset is included in the package.
In the area of market microstructure, dimensional analysis leads to new insights which are neither obvious nor well-known. Dimensional analysis makes it possible to describe various microscopic properties of financial markets in simple macroscopic terms.
I. Dimensional Analysis and Leverage
Neutrality.
Trading is costly; bets tend to move market prices relative to pre-trade benchmarks. Buy bets push prices up and sell bets push prices down relative to pre-trade price levels. These adverse price movements, called "market impact," occur as a result of adverse selection; since traders on the opposite side of the bet believe correctly that bets contain private information, they require a price concession as compensation. Transaction cost models quantify trading costs. Good transaction cost models are of great interest to traders.
Suppose that the market impact cost of executing a bet of Q jt shares is a function of the number of shares Q jt , the stock price P jt , share volume V jt , return variance σ 2 jt , and dollar "bet cost" C. The subscript jt refers to stock j at time t. The values of P jt , V jt , and σ 2 jt are potentially observable or readily estimated from data. The hypothesis of market microstructure invariance, discussed below, implies that C can be written without subscripts jt. The value of C may be difficult to observe empirically.
Let
jt , C) denote the price impact cost as a fraction of the value traded P jt |Q jt |; the quantity G jt is dimensionless, with G jt ≥ 0. Writing g instead of g jt reflects the important assumption that the price impact cost is a function only of its parameters and not other characteristics of asset j at time t. The function arguments Q jt , P jt , V jt , σ 2 jt , and C are measured using units of currency, shares, and time.
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Dimensional analysis requires paying careful attention to consistency of units. The value of Q jt is measured in units of shares, P jt is measured in units of dollars per share, V jt is measured in units of shares-per-day, σ 2 jt is measured in units of per-day, and C is measured in units of dollars. For example, if the stock's daily percentage return volatility is 2 percent, then σ 2 jt is 0.0004 per day. The implications of dimensional analysis depend critically on the fact that return variance is measured per day and therefore return standard deviation σ jt is measured in units per-square-root-of-a-day. More formally, if units of currency are reduced by a factor U, shares by a factor S, and time by a factor T, then |Q jt | increases by a factor S, P jt increases by a factor US −1 , V jt increases by a factor ST −1 , σ 2 jt increases by a factor T −1 , and C increases by a factor U. Since there are three sets of distinct units and five dimensional quantities-Q jt , P jt , V jt , σ 2 jt , C-it is possible to form two independent dimensionless quantities. Without loss of generality, let L jt and Z jt denote these dimensionless quantities, defined by
Here m 2 is a dimensionless scaling constant discussed in more detail below, and the exponent of one-third in the definition of L jt is chosen strategically for important reasons related to leverage neutrality discussed below.
Without loss of generality, re-define the arguments of the function g so that it is written as g (P jt This implication of dimensional analysis is based on the simple assumption that investors are not confused by units of measurement. In the context of a rational model, this implies that investors do not suffer money illusion, do not change their behavior when shares are split, and do not confuse calendar time with business time. To the extent that research in behavioral finance questions these assumption, dimensional analysis provides the appropriate rational benchmark against which predictions of behavioral finance may be measured. Dimensional analysis alone leads to the result that the market impact cost of a bet of Q jt shares, expressed as a fraction of the bet value P jt |Q jt |, must be a function of the two variables L jt and Z jt , assuming the five arguments Q jt , P jt , V jt , σ 2 jt , C define a correct specification for the function.
To refine the transaction cost model further, introduce a conservation law in the form of leverage neutrality. This is closely related to Modigliani-Miller equivalence, the idea that a change in leverage-the ratio of firm's debt to firm's equity-does not affect the underlying economics of the risk transfer represented by a bet of Q jt shares. Suppose that the stock is levered up by a factor A as a result of paying a cash dividend of (1 − A −1 ) P jt financed with cash or riskless debt. Since a bet of Q jt shares transfers the same economic risk, the number of shares in a bet Q jt does not change, and trading volume V jt does not change. Since the economic risk of a bet does not change, the dollar cost of the bet C does not change either. The ex-dividend price of a share is A −1 P jt because the value of the share-plus-dividend is conserved. Each share continues to have the same dollar risk P jt σ jt ; therefore, the return standard deviation σ jt increases to A σ jt , and the return variance σ
It is straightforward to verify that L jt changes to A −1 L jt and Z jt remains unchanged. Strategically incorporating the exponent 1/3 into the definition of L jt has the effect of making L jt scale inversely proportionally with A, just like P jt . The percentage cost G jt of executing a bet of Q jt shares changes by a factor A because the dollar cost of executing this bet remains unchanged while the dollar value of the bet scales inversely proportionally with P jt , from P jt |Q jt | to A −1 P jt |Q jt |. Leverage neutrality thus implies that for any A, the function g satisfies the ho-
The dimensionless and leverage neutral product G jt L jt must be a function of the dimensionless and leverage neutral argument Z jt . In a more explicit form, we have
The percentage cost of executing a bet scales inversely with L jt . In terms of the original five parameters, the restrictions imposed by dimensional analysis and leverage neutrality can equivalently be spelled out as (3)
Equation (3) describes a general specification for transaction costs functions consistent with the scaling implied by dimensional analysis and leverage neutrality. This general specification is consistent with different assumptions about the shape of the function f .
The variables L jt and Z jt have an intuitive interpretation. Suppose that bet sizẽ Q jt is a random variable, withQ jt > 0 for buy bets,Q jt < 0 for sell bets, and E{Q jt } = 0. Without loss of generality, choose the scaling constant m 2 such that E{|Z jt |} = 1. Then Z jt can be interpreted as "scaled bet size" because it expresses the size of a bet Q jt as a multiple of mean unsigned bet size E{|Q jt |}. The definition of Z jt also implies 1/L jt = C/(E{P jt |Q jt |}). Since the numerator C is the expected dollar cost of a bet and the denominator E{P jt |Q jt |} is the expected dollar value of the bet, the variable 1/L jt thus measures the value-weighted expected market impact cost of a bet, expressed as a fraction of the dollar value traded. It is reasonable to interpret 1/L jt as illiquidity index and L jt as liquidity index.
More liquid markets are associated with more bets of larger sizes. Indeed, the choice of a constant m 2 such as E{|Z jt |} = 1 implies that
It can be further shown using the definitions of L jt and Z jt in equations (1) that the number of bets, denoted γ jt and equal to γ jt = V jt /E{|Q jt |}, is given by
The number of bets increases with liquidity twice faster than their sizes. The last equation implies another interpretation of the illiquidity measure 1/L jt . If one considers financial markets operating not in calendar time but rather in business time, with a clock linked to the arrival rates of bets, then the illiquidity measure is proportional to return volatility in business time 1/L jt ∼ σ jt /γ 1/2 jt . The value of 1/L jt is a scaling factor for all illiquidity measures. Bets of different sizes arrive to the market at a rate γ jt bets per day and move prices by about σ jt /γ jt 1/2 per bet, ultimately generating return variance of σ 2 jt per day. Define trading activity W jt := σ jt P jt V jt as the product of dollar volume and return volatility; the value of W jt measures the aggregate risk transferred in one calendar day. Trading activity W jt is leverage neutral, but not dimensionless; it is measured in units of "currency per time-to-the-3/2-power." Using the definition of 1/L jt in equation (1) and the expression for γ jt in equation (5), we obtain
Trading activity provides an alternative way to relate business time γ jt and the liquidity index L jt to observable variables. To summarize, the combination of dimensional analysis and leverage neutrality reduces the problem of describing a transaction cost function from determining the specification of a function of five parameters g(Q jt , P jt , V jt , σ 2 jt , C) to determining the specification of a function of only one parameter f (Z jt ). The percentage transaction costs (2) can be presented as the product of a dimensionless security-specific measure of illiquidity 1/L jt and a dimensionless function f (Z jt ) of scaled bet size Z jt , which is dimensionless and leverage neutral.
II. Market Microstructure Invariance.
Dimensional analysis does not generate operational market microstructure predictions per se. To obtain useful empirical predictions based on transaction costs model (3), it is necessary to think about how to measure relevant quantities. The derivation above refers to at least five quantities: asset price P jt , trading volume V jt , return volatility σ jt , bet size Q jt , bet cost C, and possibly other measures of transaction costs such as bid-ask spreads. Three of the quantities-asset price P jt , trading volume V jt , and return volatility σ jt -can be observed directly or readily estimated from public data feeds on securities transactions; these are observable characteristics of an asset. The size Q jt is a characteristic of a bet privately known to a trader. While bid-ask spreads can be observed from public data feeds, other estimates of transaction costs generally requires having confidential data on transactions which allows transactions of one trader to be distinguished from transactions of another. More ambiguous is the issue of how the cost of a bet C and the scaling parameter m 2 might or might not vary across assets. In the context of this paper, market microstructure invariance is defined as the two empirical hypotheses that the dollar value of C and the dimensionless scaling parameter m 2 are the same for all time periods and for all assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, foreign exchange, and derivatives. To apply invariance across markets with different currencies and real exchange rates, it is necessary to scale the expected dollar cost C by the productivity-adjusted wages of finance professionals in the local currency; this additional scaling makes the parameter C dimensionless by adjusting for inflation and productivity.
These invariance hypotheses are neither implications of dimensional analysis nor an implications of leverage neutrality. The a priori justification for the invariance hypotheses is Ockham's razor: these are the simplest possible empirical hypotheses. The invariance hypotheses are motivated by the intuition that asset managers allocate scarce intellectual resources across assets and across time in such a manner that the dollar cost of bets C is equated. The scalar m 2 is expected to be constant across assets and across time if distributions of informational signals and therefore bet sizes are constants across assets and across time. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016c) define market microstructure invariance as the empirical hypotheses that the dollar risks transferred by bets and the transaction costs of executing bets are the same when the sizes of bets are measured as the risks they transfer in business time. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016b) derive equivalent invariance principles as endogenous properties of a dynamic equilibrium model of informed trading. The contribution of this paper is to show that the same invariance principles are implications of the most parsimonious assumptions imaginable.
Under the invariance assumptions, instead of having different models for different securities and different time periods, it is necessary to calibrate only two parameters C and m 2 for all assets, not different values for each asset. Together with the shape of the invariant cost function f (Z jt ) in equation (2), the knowledge of the parameters C and m 2 makes it possible to write an operational transaction costs model for any market. The constants C and m 2 help to relate the microscopic details of trading in a security to its macroscopic properties. For example, these two invariant constants relate the microscopic size distribution and transaction cost of a bet to observable macroscopic dollar volume P jt V jt and volatility σ jt .
Preliminary calibration in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016c) is consistent with the approximate values C ≈ $2, 000 and m 2 ≈ 0.25. These estimates are based on a large sample of portfolio transitions orders. A portfolio transition occurs when a large investor, such as a pension plan sponsor, hires a professional third party to make the trades necessary to move assets from from one asset manager to another.
If invariance holds, the dimensionless liquidity index
natural, simple measure of liquidity which is easy to calculate using data on volume and volatility. These security-specific metrics does not change when a stock splits or the frequency with which data is sampled changes. The general specification f for a transaction cost function (3) is consistent with different functional forms. Suppose that f is a power function of the form f (Z jt ) = λ |Z jt | ω . A proportional bid-ask spread cost (ω = 0) implies
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A linear market impact cost (ω = 1) implies
A square-root market impact cost (ω = 1/2) implies
Empirical estimates often support the square root specification with a proportionality factor close to one, as noted in Grinold and Kahn (1995) . Equation (3) is a general structural transaction costs model. Equations (7), (8), and (9) are special cases consistent with invariance. In the three transaction cost models (7), (8), and (9), the constants on the right side are dimensionless.
The linear price impact model (8) implements the price impact parameter λ = σ V /σ U from the model of Kyle (1985) as
). An alternative model in the spirit of Amihud (2002) (8) by the factor γ 1/2 , which makes G jt dimensionless, converts trading volume into the standard deviation of order imbalances, and scales the constant of proportionality so that it does not vary with jt.
III. Empirical Evidence based on Bid-Ask Spreads and Number of Trades in the Russian equities market.
Dimensional analysis and leverage neutrality imply a scaling law for the quoted bid-ask spread, which measures the difference between the highest price at which a trader is willing to buy ("bid") and the lowest price at which a trader is willing to sell ("offer"). Let S jt denote the bid-ask spread measured in the same units as price P jt . From equation (7), market microstructure invariance implies (10) log
For empirical estimation, the unknown invariant constants C and m 2 can be factored out of the definition of L jt and incorporated into the constant term in equation (10). Given definition of 1/L jt , the coefficient of one on log(1/L jt ) implies a scaling exponent of −1/3 on P jt V jt σ −2 jt . To test this relationship, we use data from the Moscow Exchange for JanuaryDecember 2015 provided by Interfax Ltd. The data cover 50 Russian stocks in the RTS index as of June 15, 2015. The five largest companies are Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Novatek, and Sberbank. The Russian stock market is centralized with all trading implemented in a consolidated limit-order book. Since the tick size was small during this period, this market friction was less likely to affect the bid-ask spreads of Russian stocks than in other markets with larger tick size, like the U.S. stock market. The lot size was small in the Russian stock market as well. For each of the 50 stocks and each of the 250 trading days, the average percentage spread is calculated as the mean of the percentage spread at the end of each minute during trading hours from 10:00 to 18:50. The realized volatility is calculated based on summing squared one-minute changes in the mid-point between the best bid and best offer prices at the end of each minute during trading hours. Table 1 Figure 1 plots the log bid-ask spread log(S jt /P jt ) against log(1/L jt ). Each of 12,426 points represents the average bid-ask spread for one stock for one day. Different colors represent different stocks. For comparison, we add a solid line log(S jt /P jt ) = 2.112 + 1 log(1/L jt ), where the slope of one is fixed at the level predicted by market microstructure invariance and the intercept is estimated. All observations cluster around this benchmark line.
In the aggregate sample, the fitted line is log(S jt /P jt ) = 2.093+0.998 log(1/L jt ), with standard errors of estimates 0.040 and 0.005, respectively; the R-square is 0.876. The invariance prediction that the slope coefficient is one is not statistically rejected. The fitted line for a similar regression over monthly averages instead of daily averages is log(S jt /P jt ) = 2.817 + 1.078 log(1/L jt ) with standard errors of estimates 0.164 and 0.019, respectively; its R-square is 0.923. The invariance prediction that the slope coefficient is one is statistically rejected in this case, but remains economically close to the predicted value.
The 50 dashed lines in figure 1 are fitted based on data for the 50 individual securities. The slopes, which vary from 0.249 to 1.011, are substantially lower than the invariance-implied slope of one, which is indistinguishable from the fitted line for the aggregate data. A possible explanation is that a substantial part of the variation in stock-specific measures of trading activity is due to variations in trading activity of the overall market and may therefore be only loosely related to variations in bid-ask spreads. The downward bias is more pronounced for less liquid stocks, suggesting that it may also be related to correlation between explanatory variables and error terms due to natural endogeneity in contemporaneous variables.
As additional evidence, we also present results of testing a scaling relationship (5) for the number of bets. Bets are difficult to observe, since they are typically executed in the market as many trades. Let N jt denote the number of trades which occur per calendar day. If institutional microstructure details such as tick size and minimum lot size adjust across stocks to have similar effects on trading, it is reasonable to conjecture that the number of trades N jt is proportional to the number of bets γ jt . Figure 2 presents results of testing the prediction that N jt is proportional to σ 2 jt L 2 jt = m 2 ·γ jt from equation (5) using the data from the Moscow Exchange. The figure has 12,426 points plotting the log number of transactions log(N jt ) against log(σ jt L jt ) for each of 50 stocks and each of 250 days. For comparison with the prediction of invariance, a benchmark line log(N jt ) = −1.937 + 2 log(σ jt L jt ) is added; this line has a slope that is fixed at the predicted level of two and an intercept that is estimated. The results for the aggregate sample are broadly consistent with the predicted slope of two. The fitted line is log(N jt ) = −3.085+2.239 log(σ jt L jt ) with standard errors of estimates equal to 0.038 and 0.008, respectively; its R-square is 0.882. As before, the slopes of fitted lines for individual stocks are systematically lower, ranging from 1.156 to 1.795 and depicted with dashed lines. 
IV. Additional Applications and Extensions.
In both physics and market microstructure, application of invariance principles requires that certain assumptions be met. For example, the laws of physics hold in simplest form for objects traveling in a vacuum but have to be modified when resistance from air generates friction. Similarly, in market microstructure, the invariance assumption may hold most precisely only under idealized conditions in which market frictions are minimal. For example, the predictions of invariance may hold most closely when tick size is small, minimum lot size is not restrictive, market makers are competitive, and transaction fees and taxes are minimal. When these assumptions are not met, invariance principles provide a benchmark from which the importance of frictions such as a large tick size, non-competitive market access, or high fees and taxes can be measured.
The empirical implications of dimensional analysis, leverage invariance, and market microstructure invariance can be generalized to incorporate various trading frictions. The analysis above assumes that function g is correctly specified in terms of only five dimensional parameters Q jt , P jt , V jt , σ 2 jt , C. The approach can be easily extended to include additional function arguments. It can also be extended to derive scaling laws for other variables. Here are several illustrations.
The magnitude of transaction costs is likely to depend on other variables. Traders believe that order execution costs are lower if the execution horizon is longer. Transaction costs may also depend on market frictions such as tick size and minimum round lot size. The tick size for U.S. stocks is generally one cent, and the minimum round lot size is generally 100 shares; for Russian stocks there is more variation in these parameters. jt /V jt , respectively (up to constants of proportionality). Equation (2) then becomes
This more general specification remains consistent with scaling laws but allows for non-linear relationships among the different arguments of f . In this specification, the first two arguments are characteristics of a bet, and the last two arguments are characteristics of the market. The first argument is the scaled bet size Z jt from equation (1). The second argument is the scaled horizon equal to the expected number of bets over which a given bet is executed; it is convenient to denote it B jt , so that equation (5) for γ jt yields (12)
The last two arguments in equation (11) 
When tick size is large, larger quantities available at the best bid and offer may make the execution horizon shorter. If tick size and minimum lot size do not affect execution horizon, the participation rate
If the function h * is a constant, then it is optimal to choose the execution horizon so that traders execute all trades as the same fraction of volume, say one percent of volume until execution of the bet is completed.
Setting optimal tick size and minimum lot size is of interest for exchange officials and regulators. Let K min * jt and Q min * jt denote optimal tick size and optimal minimum lot size, respectively. Since the scaled optimal quantities K min * jt
jt /V jt are dimensionless and leverage neutral, the scaling laws for these market frictions can be written as
Since the proportionality constant does not vary across securities, these measures provide good benchmarks for comparing the restrictiveness of actual tick size and minimum lot size across securities and markets.
If exchanges set tick size and minimum lot size at their optimal levels of K min * jt and Q min * jt and traders choose optimal execution horizons T * jt , then f in equation (11) becomes a function of only one argument Z jt again.
Our approach can be also used to derive more general scaling laws for the bidask spread. The bid-ask spread is an integer number of ticks which fluctuates as trading occurs. Let S jt denote the average bid-ask spread, measured in dollars per share. Assume the average spread depends on P jt , V jt , σ (15)
If tick size and minimum lot size have no influence on quoted bid-ask spreads, then the the relationship simplifies to S jt /P jt ∼ 1/L jt , as tested above for the Russian equities market. Our approach can be also used to derive more general scaling laws for trading data. A bet of size Q jt may be executed as a large number of smaller trades. Let X jt denote a trade, a fraction of a bet. Trades and bets have the same units but different economics. While it is reasonable to conjecture that the size of bets does not depend on tick size or minimum lot size, the size of trades into which bets are "shredded" will obviously depend on both of them. With large tick size, there will typically be large quantities available at the bid and offer; therefore, large bets may be executed as trades of large size which clean out available bids and offers. Empirical evidence suggests that trades have become so small in recent years that minimum lot size is often a binding constraint, for instance, as shown in Kyle, Obizhaeva and Tuzun (2016) . Since P jt X jt /(C L jt ) is dimensionless and leverage-neutral, the same analysis as above leads to the following scaling laws for the probability distribution of tradesX jt :
Similar scaling laws can be derived for betsQ jt themselves, the quantities at the best bid and offer-Q
B jt andQ
A jt -as well as for depth at tick levels throughout the limit order book.
Let N jt denote the number of trades per day. Then the ratio N jt /γ jt denotes the average number of trades into which a bet is shredded. Suppose that the number of trades N jt also depends on tick size and minimum lot size. Since the number of bets γ jt is proportional to σ 2 jt L 2 jt , the value of N jt satisfies the following generalization of equation (5):
The extensions discussed here suggest new research directions for empirical market microstructure.
